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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH 
VERA M~. STOUT, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON FIRE. AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9873 
AP·P·ELLANT''S BRIEF 
NATURE OF. THE (!ASE 
This is an action under a fire insurance policy to 
recover for personal property destroyed by fire. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pre-trial hearing upon a stipulation of facts, 
the parties submitted to the Oourt upon written memor-
anda the point of liability which hinged upon the mean-
ing of the word "premises" in ~the policy. The Court 
ruled that "premises" included a tire recapping shop 
located at the rear of the lot upon which the insured 
dwelling stood, and the defendant was liable f'Or the full 
value of personal property stored therein which was 
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destroyed by fire, rather than ten per cent (10%) of 
the value as provided for unscheduled personal property 
located "off pren1ises." Defendant appeals frmn this 
judgrnent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal·of the judgment and judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of law as to the extent 
of iis liability as will be herein set forth. 
STATEl\tfENT OF FACTS 
On June 6, 1961 Plaintiff secured a policy of fire 
insurance from Defendant insuring a frame dwelling 
used as her home. ' The policy provided inter alia for 
coverage on "Unscheduled Personal Property" in the 
total amount of Six Thousand D·olla.rs ( $6-,000.00). By 
the terms of the policy as set forth under the caption 
"Coverage C-Unscheduled Personal Property" two 
alternatives are provided for: 
1. "On Premises: This policy covers un-
scheduled personal property usual or incidental 
to the premises as a dwellirng owned, worn or 
used by an insured while on the premises, etc.", 
in actual value up to $6,000.00, and 
2. "Away Frmn Premises: This policy also 
covers unscheduled personal property AS DE-
SCRIBED AND LIMITED· while elsewhere than 
on the premises, anywhere in the world, owned, 
worn 'Or used by insured * * *. T·HE LIMIT of 
this company's liability for such property while 
away from premises shall be an additional amount 
of insurance equal to ten per cent ( 10%) of the 
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amount specified for Coverage C ·and in no event 
less than One Thousand Dollars ( $1,000.00) ." 
(En1phasis added) 
Located 50 to 75 feet to the rear of the frame 
dwelling insured but on the san1e lot was a building 
used .as a tire recapping shop by plaintiff's family. 
It is not disputed by plaintiff that the insurance rate 
on such tire recapping shop was higher than the rate 
on the frame dwelling because of the increased fire 
hazard inherent in the nature ·of the work done in the 
shop. Wbile defendant did not insure rthe tire recapping 
shop, it is admitted by plaintiff that she had fire insur-
ance on said recapping shop with another company, 
but the fire insurance did not cover any personal prop-
erty stored therein. 
At a time prior to August 2, 1961 and while plain-
tiff's insurance contract with defendant was in force, 
plaintiff stored in the tire recapping shop certain items 
of personal property which apparently were an overflow 
from the storage facilities in her home. It is admitted 
that these iterns of personal property \Yere of a house-
hold nature and were not connected with the business 
of the tire recapping shop. 
On or about August 2, 1961 the tire recapping shop 
burned, and the personal property alluded to herein 
was destroyed by fire. While the elmnent of darnages 
has never been presented to a court or jury, plaintiff 
sues for approximately Five Thousand Dollars ($5,-
000.00) as the value of the personal property lost, and 
the Insurance Oompany, defendant herein, has· taken 
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the position that it is liable only to the extent of ten 
per cent (10%) of the actual value of said property as 
per the provisions of fhe policy as above set forth, 
defendant taking the positron that the destroyed per-
sonal property was not on the premises insured. Judge 
EUett ruled the recapping shop was a part of the prem-
ises which has the effect of 1naking the defendant liable 
for the actual value of the destroyed property up to 
$6,000.00. 
ARG Ul\tfENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WORD 
"PREMISES" INCLUDED THE TIRE RECAPPING SHOP, 
THUS MAKING DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR THE FULL 
VALUE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY DESTROYED WHEN 
BY A STRICT INTERPRE'TATION OF THE TERMS OF 
THE CONTRACT AND THE APPLICABLE LAW THE TIRE 
RECAPPING SHOP WAS NOT A PART OF THE PREMISES 
INSURED, AND THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY BY THE 
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
ONLY TEN PER CENT (10%) OF THE VALUE OF SAID 
PERSONAL PROPER'TY, OR $1,000.00, WHICHEVER IS THE 
GREATER. 
The sole issue of law to be detennined herein is 
the definition of the word "premises" as used in the 
policy of insurance .as it relates to unscheduled personal 
property. If the Court find's ~that the tire recapping 
shop is a part of the premises insured by defendant, 
then defendant is liable for the actual value of the per-
S'Onal household property stored and destroyed therein. 
Conversely, if the Court finds that the tire recapping 
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shop was not a part of the premises insured, then the 
defendant's liability is lin1ited to ten per cent (10%) 
of the value of the personal property, or $1,000.00, 
whichever is greater. 
In defining "premises" we are not here concerned 
with conventional or dictionary definitions. The policy 
itself specifically defines the word as it applies to the 
contractual relationship of the parties. In at least three 
places in the insurance contract the company defines 
premises for purposes of its liability assumption. Under 
the statement of Declarations appearing at the top of 
the first unnumbered page following Page 4 of the con-
tract we read: 
"Declarations 
The premises occupied by the Named Insured 
is situated in a building occupied by not more 
than ______ families. The described premises is 
occupied by not more than one family in addi-
tion to the ~ amed Insured's family and by not 
more than two roomers or boarders." 
On Page 3, under General Conditions, at 2.(d) we 
read: 
"General ·Conditions 
Premises 
The unqualified word "premises" means the 
pren1ises described in the Declarations, includnig 
grounds, garages, stables and orther outbuildings 
incidental thereto, and private approaches there-
to." (Emphasis added) 
On the face or title page of the contract the tire 
recapping shop is excluded from the premises insured 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the staten1ent appearing in the center of said title 
page, which reads : 
"The described dwelling of frame construc-
tion is occupied by not 1nore than two families 
and not 1nore than two roomers or hoarders per 
fa1nily .... The described dwelling is not seasonal 
and no business pursuits are conducted' at the 
pre.Jnises thereof: Exceptions if any. (No excep-
tions noted) (En1phasis added) 
From the ahove definitions it is clear that "prmnises" 
relates to a "building" (singular and not plural) which 
is to be used as a .dwell.ing, together with grounds, 
garages, etc., inciilenta.Z to that singular dwelling as a 
dwelUVng. A tire recapping shop, therefore, which is 
used not as an incident to the occupancy of the dwelling, 
but rather as a business operation, does not come within 
the definition. 
This position is further supported by the fact that 
the paragraphs of coverage concerning unseheduled 
personal property refer both to the personal property 
on premises and the same personal property away from 
premises, providing specific coverage in each instanee. 
The paragraph relating to personal property on premises 
provides "this policy covers unscheduled personal prop-
erty usual O'r incidental to the occupancy of the premises 
as a dwelUmg ... . ", again emphasizing a singular build-
ing or dwelling and occupancy as a dwelling. 
The question of what building or buildings are to 
be included in defining premises in an insurance policy 
in a fact situation strikingly similar to the one rut bar 
appears in the case of R~ckerson v. Gennan-AmeriCO!n 
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Insurnnce Cornpany of New York, 32 N.Y. Suppl. 1026. 
The policy of insurance in that case described the prem-
ises insured as "a brick building and additions, No. 160 
M Street, occupied by stores and dwellings." There were 
in that case a two story brick building occupied as a 
store on the ground floor and dwellings on rthe second 
floor, with a brick factory building on the rear portion 
of the land described. The two buildings were connected 
by a frame structure, the walls of which in part were 
the walls of the brick buildings. PasS'age from one brick 
building to the other was impossible through the frame 
structure, except by going through windows. The court 
ruled that the rear building was not part of the premises 
and not covered by the insurance policy. The court said 
in part: 
"The question presented is whether the policy 
in question covered the rear building as well as 
the front. It is to be observed that there is only 
one building insured, with the additions to such 
building, which it is repr~sented in the policy 
were occupied as stores and dwellings. It is 
difficult to conceive how the rear building is to 
be considered .as an addition to the front building, 
there being no connection between the two, be-
cause this small frame structure cannot be con-
sidered a connection. It certainly was not in-
tended to connect the rear with the front bui~ding, 
nor was it used for any such purpose. The fact 
of the existence of windows in the front and 
rear buildings, making it possible to crawl into 
this frame structure, temporary in its nature, 
in no manner made t!he large brick faCJtory an 
addition to the smaller building on the front. 
And furthermore, by the terms of the policy, 
the building insured is represented ·as being 
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occupied for stores and dw.elli'll[J·s, and it is only 
the front building that answers this description. 
The rear building was used almost entirely .as a 
factory, with a very small portion of it occupied 
as a store for the sale of the goods manufactured 
therein. Under these circumstances, it is difficult 
to see how, under the terms of the policy as it 
reads, it is possible to include ~this rear factory 
building. As has already been observed, the 
buidlings were absolutely independent of each 
other, and intended for d.iff erent uses; and the 
mere fact that this frame structure adjoined each 
building could in no way n1ake the rear building 
an addition to the front building, any more than 
it could make the front building an addition to 
the rear." (Emphasis added) 
In the case at bar the building in which the personal 
property was located, for the loss of which plaintiff 
seeks to recover, was used as a tire recapping shop, 
was located sorne distance from the home, had no con-
nection with the home as a home or dwelling, was not 
a building appurtenant to the dwelling as a garage or 
outdoor privy would be, and can in no wise be considered 
a "dwelling." The reasoning of Rickerson v. Germau-
AJnerican Insurance Company of New York case, supra, 
therefore seems compelling here. 
The provisions of the policy relating to business 
and business pursuits lend further e1nphasis in that 
connection. The policy provides on its face "described 
dwelling is not seasonal and no business pursuits are 
conducted at the prernises thereof;" again it is to be 
noted that the word "premises" designates a singular 
dwelling as Rickerson, supra, designated a singular 
building. 
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There is some additional case law in a parallel area 
where the word "premises" has been construed. Typical 
of these holdings is Sexton v. Hawkeye Insurance Com-
pany, 69 Iowa 99, 28 NW 462, which held that where ·an 
insurance policy provides that if the insured pren1ises 
should become vacant the policy should become void, 
"premises" referred to the house insured and not to the 
land upon which the house was located. The court said 
in part: 
"Counsel also argue that the condition requir-
ing occupancy applies to the land upon which 
the house is situated, and that as it was occupied 
the condition has been performed. The ground 
of this position is that the land is particularly 
described, and the condition declares that if the 
premises are vacant, the policy shall become void. 
Counsel thinks that the word "prernises" refers 
to the land as well as the house. This cannot he 
admitted. The land is described in order to desig-
nate the location of the house; the land is not 
insured; the house is. It is very plain that the 
word "premises" refers to the property insured." 
(Emphasis added) 
There is a further argument which is persuasive 
for the position that "premises" includes only the insured 
dwelling and any structures appurtenant or incidental 
to it as a dwelling. r.rhat is, to permit plaintiff to succeed 
here would be to allow him to recover for property in 
a building which building itself was not covered by the 
terms of the policy. It is admitted by the plaintiff that 
the tire recapping shop itself was not insured by defen-
dant, it being a hazard expressly excluded by the tern1s 
of the policy. It would offend logic., therefore, to rule 
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that personal property used as incidental to ~the occu-
pancy of the dwelling, which is placed in this business 
location with its increased hazard, v,~as a risk intended 
to he asstuned by the insurer. The logic of this position 
is clear, in view of the fact that the policy a·t a reduced 
coverage insures said personal property \\·hen "away 
from premises." 
Finally, in the ease of Ziebarth et 1-tx v. F£delily 
and Guaranty Fire Corporation of Baltimo·re, llfary-
land, 41 NW 2d 632, Suprmne Court of Wisconsin, a 
policy of fire insurance issued on a dwelling house pro-
vided that the insured might apply up to ten per cent 
(10%) of the full an1ount of insurance on private struc-
tures other than the dwelling itself and located on the 
p·remises. The insureds therein 'had a two-car frame 
garage on the back of their lot. This garage was used 
to carry on the business of the insured which was the 
repairing of automobiles. The garage burned. The 
Supreine Court of \Visconsin held that defendant insurer 
was not obliged to pay the ten per cent (10%) of the 
policy coverage for the loss of the garage even though 
i·t was on the same lot as the insured dwelling under the 
following reasoning: 
"The policy in question was for a dwelling 
house. By referring to private structures apper-
taining to the dwelling house its coverage was 
limited to buildings generally in the individual 
and private use of the owner. A car repair shop 
which was open to the public was thus definitely 
excluded." 
It is admit·ted that Zieb,arth, supra, is not precisely 
in point with the case at bar but certainly shows the 
10 
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reasoning of the courts in defining such .things as prem-
ises, private and public uses and related n1atters in this 
general field of insurance. It is defendant's position that 
unless an item of personal property was either located 
in the insured frame dwelling itself or in an outbuilding 
directly related to the frame building as a dwelling, 
such item or items of personal property, even though 
they were 50 feet away from said building, would not 
be on the premises as defined by the policy, and their 
loss would be compensated by the ten per cent ( 10%) 
value provision of the policy, which ten per cent (10%) 
valuation would follow such an item of personal property 
virtually to the ends of the earth. No loose dictionary 
definitions of premises which usually include the entire 
parcel of land are applicable here particularly in the 
light of the Sexton case, supra, which as above set forth 
says: "The land is not insured; the house t"is." 
Plaintiff respondent will undoubtedly take the posi-
tion that the general rule that contracts are to be con-
strued against their composers should operate against 
appellant herein. It is clear in the law that this doc-
trine does not apply when construing the location of the 
property insured. See Jefferson County Bank v. Insu.r-
ance Company of the State of Pennsylvanta, (1933) 251 
Ky. 502, 65 SvV 2d 474, wherein it was said in part: 
"Ordinarily insurance contracts are con-
strued against the insurers, but that is not true 
as to the location of the property insured. The 
policy will not be extended to property not in the 
terms of the description in this respect .... 
"If the average reasonable man were told 
this company had lurnber in its mill, had lmnber 
11 
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on its open yard, and had insurance on the lumber 
on its yard, he would not for a mOinent think the 
lun1her in the mill was insured." (E1nphasi~ 
added) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respeetfully submitted that the personal prop-
erty in question was, for the purposes of this lawsuit 
and under the tern1s of the policy, "away from prem-
ises," and it would be manifestly unjust and offensive 
to logic to allow a person to take quantities of furniture, 
clothing and other personal property which was virtually 
an overflow from their insured dwelling and place said 
quantities of personal property in a building used as a 
tire recapping shop with a high fire potential haz.ard 
and, when the tire recapping shop burns, destroying the 
personal property which should have been in the dwell-
ing, to allow him to recover the full amount of the value 
of said personal property. 
With this in mind the policy very prudently, and 
fairly, llinits the insurer's liability to personal property 
elsewhere than in the dwelling to the sum of ten per 
cent (10%) of the value of the property or $1,000.00, 
whichever is the greater. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTIAN RONNOW 
@ MABE~ RONNOW & 
MADSEN, 
12 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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